Lawyer Advertising: Permissibility of Indicating the Nature of Legal Practice in Advertisements by Alcott, Kenneth J.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 7
1982
Lawyer Advertising: Permissibility of Indicating the
Nature of Legal Practice in Advertisements
Kenneth J. Alcott
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth J. Alcott, Lawyer Advertising: Permissibility of Indicating the Nature of Legal Practice in Advertisements, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 171
(1982).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/7
LAWYER ADVERTISING: PERMISSIBILITY OF INDICATING
THE NATURE OF LEGAL PRACTICE IN ADVERTISEMENTS
Canon 27 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908, provided that it was "unprofessional"
for lawyers to advertise or solicit professional employment.1 This prohibi-
tion made sense in a time when most lawyers were general practitioners
and communities were small, so that a lawyer's reputation was well
known. 2 However, the increasing size and complexity of both society and
the law have made it necessary for lawyers to select certain areas of law in
which to practice s in order to develop the expertise necessary to deal with
today's complex legal issues. A corresponding need has developed to in-
form the public about the detail and variety of legal services that are
available."
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court declared that absolute
prohibitions on lawyer advertising are violative of the first amendment.5
In January, 1982, the Supreme Court again dealt with lawyer advertising
in In re R.M.J.6 The purpose of this comment is to examine the constitu-
£' tional validity of the various approaches used by the states to regulate the
areas of law practiced in light of the Supreme Court's decision in In re
R.M.J. Specifically, the constitutionality of restrictions upon the three
primary methods of advertising areas of legal practice will be examined.
These methods are: (1) advertising a legal speciality; (2) advertising that
one's practice is limited or restricted to certain areas of the law; and (3)
listing the areas of law in which one practices in an advertisement.
1. Canon 27 was the original predecessor to the advertising provisions of MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1981). Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First
Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 967, 968.
2. A 1908 canon of ethics stated: "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible
... is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust." Id.
3. The day of the predominance of the general practitioner is, in many respects, virtually
gone: "In a national poll, 65 percent of the young lawyers surveyed considered themselves
specialists and 73 percent said they spent more than 40 percent of their time practicing in a
single area." Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A.J. 808, 810 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Rules and Advertising].
4. According to a national survey published in 1977 by the American Bar Foundation, 83
percent of the public agreed with the statement that "people do not go to lawyers because
they have no way of knowing which lawyers are competent to handle their particular
problems." Andrews, supra note 1, at 968 (citing B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SuRvEY 228 (American Bar Foundation 1977)).
5. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
6. In re R.M.J., - U.S. _ 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
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I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF IN RE R.M.J.
A. Background
In a series of commercial speech cases over the last decade,7 the United
States Supreme Court has developed an analytical framework to be used
to determine the constitutional validity of restrictions on professional ad-
vertising. Because these cases have dealt primarily with absolute prohibi-
tions of certain forms of speech or communication which the Court gener-
ally rejected as violative of the first amendment, these cases afford little
guidance regarding the constitutional validity of regulations which allow
some but not all types of promotional communications." In re R.M.J. rep-
resents an attempt by the Court to provide some much needed guidance
in evaluating the constitutionality of such regulations in the context of
lawyer advertising.
In In re R.M.J., the Court articulated the analytical framework that
has been developed in the key cases regarding commercial speech gener-
ally and lawyer advertising specifically. Citing Bates v. State Bar,9 the
Court stated that lawyer advertising is a form of commercial speech that
is protected by the first amendment so that advertising by attorneys may
not be subjected to blanket suppression. 10 The Court emphasized that its
decision in Bates was a narrow one and that advertising by lawyers could
be regulated in appropriate circumstances."
B. The In Re R.M.J. Analysis
In summarizing the development of the commercial speech doctrine as
it applies to professional advertising, the Court articulated its analytical
framework as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections
of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the
advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has
proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may im-
pose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited en-
tirely. But the states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types
of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if
the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. 2
7. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
8. Andrews, supra note 1, at 971.
9. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
10. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 935 (1982).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 937.
172 [Vol. 17:171
LAWYER ADVERTISING
The Court further stated that "even when the communication is not
misleading, the state retains some authority to regulate it. 1" To be con-
stitutional, such regulations must conform with the three-part test formu-
lated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, requiring that (1) a substantial governmental interest be asserted as
justification for the regulation; (2) the regulation directly advance the
governmental interest asserted; and (3) the regulation be not more exten-
sive than necessary to serve that interest.14
C. Application to the Facts in In re R.M.J.
In re R.M.J. involved the Missouri Supreme Court rule which specified
how areas of practice could be listed in an advertisement. The rule speci-
fied that a lawyer could use one or more terms from a specified list of
twenty-three areas of practice but could not deviate from the precise
wording stated in the rule in describing these areas."' The advertisement
at issue included a listing of areas of practice which did deviate from the
language of the rule." In the disbarment proceedings that resulted, the
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the constitutionality of the rule.17
The United States Supreme Court noted that the state did not assert
that the appellant's listing was misleading. Nor upon its own examination
did the Court find the listing to be misleading.1 8 The Court concluded
that "because the listing published by the appellant has not been shown
to be misleading, and because the [State Bar] Advisory Committee sug-
gests no substantial interest promoted by the restriction,. . . this portion
of Rule 4 is an invalid restriction upon speech as applied to appellant's
advertisements."' 9
It should be emphasized that the actual result in this case is less signifi-
13. Id. at 937 n.15 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
14. 447 U.S. at 566.
15. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, addendum I (Vernon 1977), cited in In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929,
931, 933 & n.6 (1982).
16. A typical version of the appellant's advertisements which was published in August,
1978, included a listing of 23 areas of practice. Four of the areas conformed to the language
prescribed in the rule. Eleven of the areas deviated from the precise language of the rule,
e.g., "tax" instead of "taxation law," and "real estate" instead of "property law." Eight
other areas listed in the advertisement were not listed in any manner in the rule, e.g., "con-
tracts" and "securities-bonds." 102 S. Ct. at 934 n.8.
17. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), reu'd 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982). The Missouri
Supreme Court, shortly after the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re R.M.J.,
vacated the rules governing lawyer advertising, pending a study to develop new rules. The
court indicated that the rules would not be enforced until new ones were formulated. Law-
yer Ad Decision Raising More Questions, 68 A.B.A.J. 407, 407 (1982).
18. "The use of the words 'real estate' instead of 'property' could scarcely mislead the
public." 102 S. Ct. at 938.
19. Id.
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cant than the analytical framework articulated in the opinion. The opin-
ion itself stresses that the holding is limited to the facts of the case 20 and
that the analysis articulated is to be applied on a case by case basis.
21
Furthermore, because of the particular facts of the case, the Court was
not required to apply the full analysis to arrive at its decision.2 Conse-
quently, questions remain as to the application of this analytical frame-
work to other forms of regulating the advertising of areas of law
practiced.
II. CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE In Re R.M.J. ANALYSIS
A. What is Misleading?
In In re R.M.J. the state did not assert that the attorney's deviation
from the prescribed list of areas of practice made his advertisement mis-
leading or deceptive. Thus, the facts of the case did not lend themselves
to a sophisticated analysis of what constitutes a deceptive or misleading
advertisement, and so the opinion provides little new guidance as to what
is misleading.23 However, the opinion does indicate that there may be
particular advertisements which, although not inherently misleading,
have been shown by experience to be misleading to the public.24 There is
also authority for the proposition that in determining whether an adver-
tisement is misleading, a court must consider not only the context of the
advertisement itself, but also the legal sophistication of the audience that
it is intended to reach.
25
20. The opinion does not even go so far as to deem the Missouri rule unconstitutional as
enacted, but holds merely that the rule's requirement of conforming to the list of 23 area
descriptions is "an invalid restriction upon speech as applied to appellant's advertise-
ments." Id. (emphasis added). The Court reiterated: "[The] restrictions in the Rule upon
appellant's First Amendment rights can [not] be sustained in the circumstances of this
case." Id. at 939 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 938 n.16.
22. In applying the analysis, the Court never got past the second part of the Central
Hudson test, since the state asserted no governmental interest in support of the restriction.
Id. at 939. See supra text accompanying note 14.
23. In determining the constitutional protection afforded a lawyer's advertisement, one
court has considered applying the strict standard used by the Federal Trade Commission in
determining whether advertisements are misleading or deceptive. See Durham v. Brock, 498
F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). The FTC standard involves determining whether an adver-
tisement "could" deceive members of the public. In making its determination, the FTC may
take into account the fact that certain members of the audience may be unlearned and
gullible. The district court pointed out that this test was at odds with the concept that
restrictions on constitutionally protected speech must be narrowly drawn. Id. at 220. The
court justified its consideration of the FTC standard by observing that the United States
Supreme Court had relied on and cited FTC precedent in Bates v. State Bar. 498 F. Supp.
at 220 (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350) (1977)).
24. See In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 936 n.11 (1982).




For these reasons, few generalizations can be made as to what consti-
tutes misleading lawyer advertising since actual experience with advertis-
ing and audience sophistication may vary from case to case.28
B. Substantial State Interest
In order to sustain a restriction on advertising, the Central Hudson
three-part test, as part of the In re R.M.J. analysis, requires that the
state show a substantial interest which will be served by the regulation.27
It is well established with regard to lawyer advertising, as with all adver-
tising and commercial speech, that the state has a substantial interest in
preventing the public from being deceived or misled by false, deceptive,
or misleading advertising.28 However, Central Hudson and In re R.M.J.
suggest that there may be other substantial state interests which could
justify restrictions even when the advertising is not false or misleading.29
Precisely what these other governmental interests are and what makes
these interests substantial for purposes of regulating lawyer advertising
remain unclear. Although other interests have been identified as substan-
tial in various advertising cases,30 In re R.M.J. provides little guidance
regarding lawyer advertising because the state asserted no governmental
interest.3'
26. There seems to be general agreement only that lawyer advertising, on the whole, is
not inherently misleading. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 935 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 372 (1977); Consumer Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 521 (E.D.
Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), original judgment reinstated on
remand, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979). However, there is much less certainty concern-
ing more specific questions. See, e.g., In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 215 (Minn. 1981)
("Claims of special expertise in an advertisement may be found to be material representa-
tions giving rise to a warranty of competence or information that is false, deceptive, or
misleading.").
27. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 936 (1982).
28. See generally supra note 7.
29. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568-69
(1980) (State interests in energy conservation and fair and efficient utility rates are clear
and substantial governmental interests justify ban on promotional utility advertising); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976) (While
the state "indisputably,. .. has a strong interest in maintaining [a high degree of] profes-
sionalism," this interest does not justify the suppression of price advertising of prescription
drugs.).
31. In lawyer advertising cases there have been few state interests, other than the preven-
tion of public deception, that have had any significance. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977). However, in 1982 the Utah Supreme Court, in approving changes to the
Utah disciplinary rules on lawyer advertising, held that maintaining high standards of dig-
nity and professionalism among Utah attorneys is a substantial state interest for purposes of
the In re R.M.J. analysis. The court used this argument to justify approval of a rule that
would permit attorneys to advertise in newspapers or the electronic media while prohibiting
advertising by billboards, direct mail, circulars, and the use of promotional items like
matchbooks and inscribed pencils and pens. In what appeared to be stretching, the court
1982]
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C. Does Regulation Directly Advance State Interest?
The second part of the Central Hudson test requires that the restric-
tion on advertising directly advance the governmental interest asserted.2
In In re R.M.J., since the advertisement in question was found to be not
misleading and since no other substantial governmental interest was as-
serted, the Court was not required to address the issue. However, some
guidance is to be found in pre-Central Hudson cases.3 3 Some of these
cases involved interests which the Court found simply were not served by
the advertising restriction.3 4 Others involved advertising regulations
which were found to be unnecessary because there were other existing
provisions that adequately served to further or protect the governmental
interest asserted. 5
attempted to harmonize Bates, Ohralik, and In re R.M.J. in an effort to support its "dig-
nity" position. Two dissenting justices argued that maintaining the dignity of the profession
was vague and subjective and did not constitute a "substantial state interest" as was in-
tended by the United States Supreme Court in In re R.M.J. In re Utah State Bar Petition,
647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
32. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
33. The Court in In re R.M.J. cited Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy and Bates as exam-
ples of cases involving restrictions which failed to comply with the second part of the Cen-
tral Hudson test. 102 S. Ct. 929, 937 (1982). See infra note 34. See also Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-78 (1977). In Bates, the state expressed
many concerns regarding the lifting of the ban on lawyer advertising. The state claimed that
the lawyer advertising would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice by stir-
ring up additional litigation and fraudulent claims. The Court responded that limiting ad-
vertising would not prevent dishonesty and fraudulent acts. The state also asserted that
lawyer advertising would have an adverse effect on the quality of legal services provided to
the public. The Court rejected this contention on the ground that restraints on advertising
were not an effective way to deter shoddy work. Id.
35. See, e.g., Consumer Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 518-19 (E.D. Va.
1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), original judgment reinstated on re-
mand, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979). The district court held that the lawyer advertising
ban was unnecessary in that other provisions of Virginia law would prevent deceptive or
misleading lawyer advertising. The court offered as examples section 18.2-216 of the Vir-
ginia Code, which provides that it is unlawful to advertise services containing any represen-
tation which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONsIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)(1976), reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:1, 216 Va. 1064, 1066
(1976), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. See also In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (state's
interest in preventing public deception and harassment not sufficiently compelling to justify
ban on direct mail advertising because alternative regulation requiring submission and re-
view of advertising materials would adequately serve the state's interest and would be less
restrictive on the first amendment rights involved). But see In re Mountain Bell Directory
Advertising, - Mont. -, -, 604 P.2d 760, 764 (1970) (rejecting argument that action for
malpractice would adequately protect public from false implication of special expertise aris-
ing from published directory listing lawyers by areas of practice).
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D. Is Regulation More Extensive than is Necessary?
The third part of the Central Hudson test requires that the regulation
be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the asserted governmental
interest." This requirement caused the regulation at issue in Central
Hudson to be declared unconstitutional and appears to be the most rigor-
ous of the requirements that the first amendment imposes upon restric-
tions on lawyer advertising.37
Although the facts in In re R.M.J. did not squarely raise an issue re-
garding the third requirement, precedent has been developed in other
cases regarding the application of this requirement to restrictions on law-
yer advertising. These cases reflect two approaches to this application.
Some courts have held that even if a restriction directly serves a govern-
mental interest, such as preventing public deception, it is unconstitution-
ally overbroad if it also prohibits certain nonmisleading, nondeceptive ad-
vertising.38 Other courts have held restrictions unconstitutionally
overbroad where the court finds that the governmental interest could be
served by a less restrictive regulation that is less offensive to the first
amendment rights involved.3 9
E. Advertising Content versus Advertising Format
The In re R.M.J. opinion raises a significant new question regarding
the application of the Supreme Court's commercial speech analysis to re-
strictions on advertising areas of practice. Prior to In re R.M.J., the
Court's approach to the protection of commercial speech provided that
the content of the communication was more highly protected than the
time, place, or manner of such communication.4 0 Restrictions on advertis-
ing content are permissible only to the extent they prohibit false, decep-
36. See supra text accompanying note 14.
37. In Central Hudson the Court stated: "To the extent that the [Public Service] Com-
mission's order suppresses [certain] speech that in no way impairs the State's interest in
energy conservation, the Commission's order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and must be invalidated." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 570 (1980). The Court also put the burden on the state to demonstrate "that its
interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation. .. ."
Id. With respect to lawyer advertising and the state's interest in preventing public decep-
tion, this standard would appear to impose a very difficult burden for any state restriction
which regulates anything but false or misleading speech. But see Foley v. Alabama State
Bar, 481 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd in part, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981) (Ala-
bama disciplinary rule which merely required submission of copy of advertisement after it
had been published constituted reasonable restriction of the manner of advertising,
designed to enable the State Bar to determine which advertisements were false and
misleading).
38, See supra note 37. See also Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 224 (M.D. Tenn.
1980); Consumer Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 522 (E.D. Va. 1976).
39. See, e.g., In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1981).
40. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 972-73.
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tive, or misleading communications or communications concerning trans-
actions that are themselves illegal.41 Restrictions on advertising format
are permissible whenever they serve a significant governmental interest
and leave open alternative channels for communication of information.41
Although referring in a footnote to the "time, place, and manner" re-
strictions discussed in Bates, the Court's summary of the commercial
speech doctrine in In re R.M.J. appears to make no distinction between
restrictions on advertising content and restrictions on the method or for-
mat of advertising.4 Whether the Court intended the level of first
amendment protection given advertising content to be equivalent to that
given advertising format is unclear. Taken literally, In re R.M.J. arguably
indicates that restrictions on the content of lawyer advertising will be
subjected to no stricter scrutiny than restrictions on time, place, or man-
ner of advertising.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE RULES ON LAWYER
ADVERTISING
A. State Approaches to Regulation
In recognition of consumers'-need for accurate information with which
they can properly select a lawyer, all the states44 and the District of Co-
lumbia have adopted rules against false, fraudulent, misleading, and de-
ceptive communications by lawyers. 45 In response to Bates, all the states
and the District of Columbia have adopted new ethics codes which are
based on the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility46 and which allow at least some promotional activity by law-
yers. 4 However, the specific provisions of state rules vary so significantly
that one commentator has described the current status of restrictions on
lawyer advertising as "a crazy quilt of regulations, differing widely in
approach.'
48
41. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
42. Andrews, supra note 1, at 973. See also Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
43. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 936 (1982). The opinion states: "When the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is ... misleading ... the states may
impose appropriate restrictions." Id. at 937 (emphasis added).
44. E.g., VmGNIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmITY DR 2-101(A) (1979) reprinted in
VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 220 Va. 616, 626 (1979).
45. There is precedent for such provisions in Federal Trade Commission actions requiring
truthful, nonmisleading product advertising. Andrews, supra note 1, at 985.
46. Id. at 986.
47. Id. at 969.
48. Rules and Advertising, supra note 3, at 809.
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Thirty states base their codes on the ABA's Proposal A,49 the version
actually adopted by the ABA. This version is referred to as the "regula-
tory approach" and allows the lawyer to advertise only those items of
information specifically provided for in the rule.50 The Missouri rule in-
volved in In re R.M.J. was this type of rule."1
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have taken what is re-
ferred to as the "directive approach" 52 based upon Proposal B of the ABA
Model Code. These provisions generally permit all advertising that is not
false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive, and in some states, self-lauda-
tory or unfair.5 3 They do not specifically provide what may be advertised,
but rather set forth guidelines as to what may not be advertised." Vir-
ginia's rule is an example of the directive approach.55
In 1981, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
released its proposed final draft of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct,"8 which are to replace the current Model Code. Rule 7.1, the general
advertising provision of the Model Rules, is similar to the directive ap-
proach of Proposal B of the Model Code in that it would permit any com-
munication by a lawyer as long as the communication is not false or mis-
leading about the lawyer or his services.5
B. Rules Regarding Specialization
The advertising rules in virtually all states, 8 the Model Code,5 9 and the
new Model Rules0 prohibit a lawyer from holding himself out as a spe-
cialist in a particular field of law unless he has been certified as a special-
ist by the state in which he practices.61 The language used to state this
49. Id.
50. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1981).
51. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 932-33 (1982).
52. Rules and Advertising, supra note 3, at 809.
53. Andrews, supra note 1, at 988.
54. Some jurisdictions (e.g., District of Columbia and New Hampshire) provide "defini-
tions" as to what is deceptive or misleading. This may act to prohibit information that is
not necessarily false or misleading on its face. Id. at 988 nn.97-98.
55. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1979), reprinted in VA.
Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 220 Va. 616, 626 (1979).
56. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
57. Id. Rule 7.1.
58. Andrews, supra note 1, at 998. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ry DR 2-104(A)(2)(1979), reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:1, 220 Va. 616, 629 (1979).
59. MODEL CODE OP PR FEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A)(3) (1981).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNaUCr Rule 7.4(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
61. The ABA Model Code, the Model Rules and all the states permit a lawyer to state
that he practices before the United States Patent and Trademark Office if he has so admit-
ted. Many jurisdictions and the Model Rules allow lawyers who are engaged in admiralty
practice to state that they are so engaged. See MODEL CODE OF PROPESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
DR 2-105(A)(1) (1981); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNmucT RULE 7.4(a), (b) (Proposed
1982]
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prohibition includes: holding oneself out as a specialist; holding oneself
out as a recognized, designated, or certified specialist; or implying special-
ization.6 2 The rationale behind these prohibitions is that specialization la-
bels imply a certain level of expertise in particular legal areas which may
or may not be warranted in a given situation where the lawyer is not a
certified specialist.63 They may also imply that the lawyer is actually cer-
tified when in fact he is not or where certification is not even available."
In sum, the predominant view is that such communication will provide
the public with no useful information with which to select a lawyer and
will serve only to mislead the public until uniform procedures for certify-
ing legal specialities or expertise have been adopted. 5
Assuming the public in fact would be misled by information regarding
specialty or expertise,66 restrictions upon advertising containing such in-
formation would be constitutional under the commercial speech analysis
set forth in In re R.M.J. Under this analysis, communications that are
Final Draft 1981); VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(1) (1979),
reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:1I, 220 Va. 616, 629 (1979).
62. Andrews, supra note 1, at 998.
63. Consumer Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 521 (E.D. Va. 1976).
64. The commentary to proposed Model Rule 7.4 gives the following explanation:
Stating that the lawyer is a "specialist" or that the lawyer's practice "is limited to" or
"concentrated in" particular fields is not permitted. These terms have acquired a sec-
ondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist. Hence, use of these terms
may be misleading unless the lawyer is certified or recognized in accordance with
procedures in the state where the lawyer is licensed to practice.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT RULE 7.4, comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
65. Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903, 912 (D.R.I. 1981).
66. According to Andrews, the assumption is
that people who hear the word specialist used with respect to lawyers understand it
to mean certified by some official body in a particular field. Since this is the meaning
the term generally has in the medical field, where consumers have heard it for years,
this is an understandable assumption. So even in states without programs, lawyers
can probably constitutionally be prohibited from saying they are specialists or recog-
nized specialists.
Andrews, supra note 1, at 999 n.152.
However, another commentator has argued that the public would not be misled, that spe-
cialization is a fact of life today, and that lawyers should be allowed to practice specialities
openly. He summarizes his argument as follows:
(1) de facto specialization exists today, therefore, it should be formally recognized;
(2) recognizing specialties will enhance the competence of lawyers in the particular
field;
(3) consumers will have access to more information by which to choose a particular
lawyer;
(4) specialization will lead to a reduction in legal service costs; and
(5) failure to recognize specialties results in lawyers being held out as competent in
all fields.
Scott, Lawyer Advertising and Specialization in Montana: An Alternative Approach, 43
MONT. L. REv. 131, 141 (1982).
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false, fraudulent, or misleading may be prohibited entirely.6 7
The Virginia State Bar contends, however, that the absolute prohibi-
tion of advertising lawyer specialization where there is no approved spe-
cialization or certification program is unconstitutional and unenforceable
in light of In re R.M.J.6 8 This position is apparently based on the premise
that advertising a specialty in such a case is not inherently misleading,
although it may be potentially misleading;69 and thus it cannot be consti-
tutionally prohibited under the In re R.M.J. analysis.
There appear to be no restrictions on lawyers' holding themselves out
as specialists where in fact they have been certified as such in the state in
which they practice. Several states have adopted various specialty certifi-
cation plans for certain areas of law.10
C. Rules Regarding Limiting or Restricting Practice
In most jurisdictions, holding oneself out as limiting or restricting one's
practice to certain areas of the law is treated the same as holding oneself
out as a specialist.7 1 In theory, the distinction between "practice limited
to" and "specialist" is that the former does not imply that the lawyer
possesses or has been certified as possessing particular expertise in the
area, whereas the latter may be taken to signify particular expertise.7
2
However, the predominant view is that in practice the lay consumer will
not make this distinction but rather will take both forms of wording to
signify particular expertise.73
Therefore, the rules in most states and those proposed by the ABA pro-
hibit any indication that a lawyer limits or restricts his practice.7 4 Under
the commercial speech analysis articulated in In re R.M.J., these prohibi-
67. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 937 (1982).
68. This is the position taken by the Bar in a petition pending before the Virginia Su-
preme Court seeking to amend the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility. The pro-
posed changes include deleting reference to a certified or recognized specialist in DR 2-
101(A) and reserving DR 201-4(A)(2) pending adoption of a specialization plan for lawyers
in Virginia. In re Petition of the Virginia State Bar to Amend the Rules of Court, Part Six,
§ II (Va. filed Mar. 15, 1982). See infra note 105.
69. The petition refers to "truthful advertising of specialization ... [in] the absence of
an approved specialization or certification program ... ." In re Petition of the Virginia
State Bar to Amend the Rules of Court, Part Six, § II, at 3-4 (Va. filed Mar. 15, 1982).
70. See generally In re Florida Bar Amendment, 399 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1981); In re Flor-
ida Bar, 319 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975); In re Petition for Rule of Court, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn.
1978); In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982); Scott, supra note 66, at 146-
47; Note, Regulation of Legal Specialization: Neglect by the Organized Bar, 56 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 293 (1980). But see In re Amendments, 267 Ark. 1181, 590 S.W.2d 2 (1979).
71. Andrews, supra note 1, at 998.
72. Scott, supra note 66, at 140.
73. See supra note 64.
74. See supra notes 59, 60.
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tions would be constitutional if the use of "limited to" or "restricted to"
is inherently misleading or if experience has shown that this wording is in
fact misleading7 5 However, whether such language is misleading is a de-
termination about which the states vary.71 A few jurisdictions do not con-
sider the limitation or restriction of a practice to be inherently mislead-
ing."7 The Virginia rule, for example, specifically permits a lawyer to hold
himself out as limiting his practice to a particular area or field of law.2 8
This would appear to be a reasonable approach. If in fact the attorney
does restrict his practice to certain areas, then this fact, combined with
other information in the advertisement, would be relevant and valuable
to the consumer in selecting a lawyer to handle a particular legal prob-
lem.79 The government's interest in preventing any potential deception or
confusion could be served by requiring some form of disclaimer indicating
that the lawyer is not a certified specialist and does not claim any special
expertise in the areas listed.80 Where the state is unable to show that
indications of limitation and restriction of practice are inherently mis-
leading or proven by experience to be misleading, an outright prohibition
of such indications should be unconstitutional under the commercial
speech analysis articulated in In re R.M.J. The communication would be
afforded first amendment protection since the information is not false or
misleading. Although the governmental interest in preventing any poten-
tial deception is substantial and the prohibition of indications of limita-
tion or restriction of practice would directly advance that interest, a dis-
claimer requirement is available as an alternative which would adequately
serve the governmental interest and be less restrictive to the first amend-
ment rights involved. Accordingly, an outright prohibition should be
deemed more extensive than is necessary to serve the government's inter-
est and therefore invalid.
D. Rules Regarding Listing Areas of Practice
An issue not easily distinguishable from the limitation of one's practice
is the listing of areas of practice in advertising, without any indication of
limitation, restriction, or specialty. However, such listing is allowed by
almost all jurisdictions, subject to varying degrees of regulation.
75. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 25 and accompahying text.
77. Andrews, supra note 1, at 1001 n.158.
78. See infra note 105. Such communications must be in accordance with the standards of
DR 2-101 (must not be false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive), DR 2-102 (relating to
professional notices, letterheads, offices and law lists), and DR 2-103 (pertaining to recom-
mendation of professional employment). VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmiLrrY
DR 2-104(B) (1979), reprinted in VA. S. CT. R. 6:11, 220 Va. 616, 629 (1979).
79. Seee supra note 11.
80. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text
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1. Regulatory Approach and Absolute Prohibition
At least one state, Oklahoma, prohibits lawyers from advertising the
areas of law in which they practice, concluding that the inclusion of such
information is, like indicating a specialty, inherently misleading.81
Sixteen states follow a regulatory type approach to listing areas of prac-
tice based on DR 2-105(A)(2) of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.8 2 These rules require lawyers to describe their practice ac-
cording to officially sanctioned designations which are specified in the
rules. The actual designations specified vary from state to state. The Mis-
souri rule in In re R.M.J. is an example of such a regulatory type ap-
proach.83 The major justification offered for these regulations is that a
81. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 996 n.134.
82. Id. at 998 n.148; Rules and Advertising, supra note 3, at 810.
83. The relevant part of the rule reads as follows:
"[T]he following areas for fields of law may be advertised by use of the specific lan-
guage hereinafter set out:
1. 'General Civil Practice'.
2. 'General Criminal Practice'
3. 'General Civil and Criminal Practice.'
"If a lawyer or law firm uses one of the above, no other area can be used .... If







6. 'Corporation Law and Business Organizations'
7. 'Criminal Law'
8. 'Eminent Domain Law'
9. 'Environmental Law'
10. 'Family Law'
11. 'Financial Institution Law'
12. 'Insurance Law'
14. 'Labor Law'
15. 'Local Government Law'
16. 'Military Law'
17. 'Probate and Trust Law'
18. 'Property Law'




23. 'Workers Compensation Law.'
"No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted and no statement of
limitation of practice can be stated.
"If one or more of these specific areas of practice are used in any advertisement,
the following statement must be included... : 'Listing of the above areas of practice
does not indicate any certification of expertise therein."'
In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 933 n.6 (1982) (quoting Mo. Sin'. CT. R. 4, addendum III
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listing of an area of practice implies specialization in that area and thus is
misleading to the public.8 4
In applying the commercial speech analysis articulated in In re R.M.J.
to an outright prohibition such as Oklahoma's, the prohibition would be
valid only if the state could show either that the listing of a lawyer's areas
of practice is inherently misleading or that experience has proven that
such listings are misleading and subject to abuse. 5 Although this deter-
mination may vary among states, the fact that the vast majority of states
have not made such a determination makes it unlikely that a state could
succeed in showing that such communications are misleading."6 Accord-
ingly, an outright prohibition of the listing of a lawyer's areas of practice
should be invalid as being more restrictive than is necessary to prevent
any potential deception.
8 7
Regarding regulatory type rules such as Missouri's, the Court in In re
R.M.J. held that the designations used by the lawyer that differed from
the State's list were not misleading and therefore could not be prohib-
ited. 88 Even if there were a concern that the list would imply specializa-
tion (and thus mislead the public), a rule prescribing the precise language
of the designations to be used in lawyer advertising does not directly
meet that concern or further the government's interest in preventing it."
Additionally, it appears that any deception could be prevented by requir-
ing the use of a disclaimer in the advertisement indicating that the lawyer
is not a specialist and claims no special expertise.90 In such a case, the
regulatory type rules would fail the In re R.M.J. analysis in that they are
more restrictive than is necessary to serve the state interest.91
Although no other state interest was put forward in In re R.M.J., an
"ostensible state interest" in prescribing the precise language to be used
in advertising is the establishment of a common set of terms to aid the
(Vernon 1977) (item 13 omitted in quoted passage)).
84. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1000. In Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp.
903, 906 (D.R.I. 1981), the district court quoted the Rhode Island Supreme Court regarding
the listing of areas of practice: "The law firm was making a claim of expertise or specializa-
tion in those areas listed in the advertisement .... Although the advertisement does not
explicitly claim expertise, potential clients could reasonably infer that the law firm had ex-
pertise in those areas of law." Id. quoting Carter v. Lovett & Linder, Ltd., 425 A.2d 1244,
1246 (R.I. 1981) (different case involving same parties before district court).
85. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 937 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 13, & 18 and note 18.
87. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. at 933, 937-39.
88. Id. at 939.
89. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1000. For example, in "Missouri the permissible term,
'Negligence Law' does not convey any less a sense of expertise than does the impermissible
'Personal Injury Law."' Id. See also supra text accompanying note 14.
90. See infra note 100 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 100-102.
91. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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public in comparing and selecting lawyers.9 2 However, this justification is
constitutionally vulnerable even assuming that securing uniformity is a
substantial state interest for purposes of the In re R.M.J. analysis.
3
Some states have apparently not yet promulgated a list of designations.9 4
In those that have, many of the terms may not be comprehensible to the
lay public and other important designations may have been omitted.9" In
these cases, the restrictions would not survive the In re R.M.J. analysis
because they do not directly advance the asserted interest and are not the
least restrictive approach.96
The Court was careful to restrict its holding in In re R.M.J. to the facts
of the case and declined to declare the Missouri rule unconstitutional on
its face. It emphasized that the rule was invalid as applied to the lawyer's
advertisement in question. 97 However, it is submitted that in the case of
the Missouri rule and any of the regulatory type rules in other states
there are infinite circumstances where, using the same analysis and rea-
soning, the Court would come up with the same result that it did in this
case. Thus, the effect of the holding in In re R.M.J. is to make these
regulatory type rules virtually unenforceable. 98
2. Disclaimer Requirement
Other state provisions allow lawyers to advertise areas of law in which
they practice, but require that a disclaimer be included in the advertise-
ment indicating that the lawyer is not a specialist.99 Although there are
varying opinions as to the effectiveness of such disclaimers, 100 several
92. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 999.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33 and notes 30-33.
94. Andrews cites Nevada, West Virginia and Wyoming as examples. Andrews, supra note
1, at 999 n.153. In these cases, lawyers are effectively prevented from communicating their
areas of practice at all. Id.
95. This was the case in In re R.M.J. Eight areas were listed in the advertisement that
were not listed in any manner by the Advisory Committee's [Committee on Professional
Ethics and Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Missouri] addendum: "contract," "avia-
tion," "securities-bonds," "pension & profit sharing plans," "zoning & land use," "entertain-
ment/sports," "food, drug & cosmetic," and "communication." Id. at 937 n.8.
96. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1000.
97. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
98. As long as a lawyer could come up with a term to describe his area of practice which
was not false or misleading, he could not constitutionally be prevented from using it in an
advertisement. Any rule that did not include the designation would be deemed unconstitu-
tional as it applied to that advertisement, as was the case in In re R.M.J.
99. Andrews offers the Pennsylvania and Tennessee rules as examples of rules that re-
quire lawyers who advertise that they limit their practice to include a disclaimer stating that
the lawyer is not recognized or certified as a specialist. In addition, the Tennessee rule pro-
vides for the statement that the lawyer "neither assert[s,] . . .[implies] or claim[s] any
particular knowledge or expertise above that of other lawyers in this community." Andrews,
supra note 1, at 997 n.138.
100. See Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (lawyer's advertise-
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courts have approved this approach as a reasonable alternative to re-
stricting or prohibiting the advertising of certain types of information. 10 1
If effective, the disclaimer requirement would directly advance the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing misleading or deceiving the public.102
Courts have acknowledged that such a requirement is no more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.0 3 Thus under the In re R.M.J.
analysis, it appears that such disclaimer requirements would be found
valid in terms of the first amendment rights involved.
3. Directive Approach
Finally, a small group of states,0 4 including Virginia, 0 5 allows the pub-
ment stating his practice to be limited to domestic relations but including disclaimer that no
particular expertise above that of the general legal community was asserted or implied
would not mislead a consumer as to the quality of the legal services being offered). In Lovett
& Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903, 911 (D.R.I. 1981), however, the court found that
listing areas of practice in an advertisement without any limiting explanation that these
were merely areas of law in which the lawyer was interested and were not necessarily his
specialty, was in fact listing the lawyer's specialties. The court added that it made no differ-
ence that the advertisement added that "we make no claim of expertise or specialization in
these matters." Id. The court called this "even more pernicious in that it deliberately states
an untruth." Id.
101. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1971).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 14 & 36-39 and note 37.
103. See, e.g., Durham, 498 F. Supp. 213.
104. Andrews cites the rules in Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey as examples of the directive approach. Andrews, supra note 1, at 1001 n.158.
105. The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility DR's 2-101(A) and 2-104 (1979),
reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 220 Va. 616, 626, 629 (1979), provides:
DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
(A) A lawyer may, on behalf of himself or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication unless such
communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or
claim. If a lawyer is a certified or recognized specialist or limits his practice as per-
mitted by DR 2-104, a public communication which so states shall be deemed not
false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive.
DR 2-104 Specialists; Limitation of Practice.
(A) A Lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as, or imply that he is, a recognized
or certified specialist, except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office may use the designation Patents, Patent Attorney, or Patent Lawyer, or any
combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign. A lawyer engaged in
the trademark practice may use the designation Trademarks, Trademark Attorney,
or Trademark Lawyer, or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and
office sign, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation
Admiralty, Proctor Admiralty, or Admiralty Lawyer, or any combination of those
terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or law prac-
tice as otherwise permitted by the Code of Professional Responsibility may hold
himself out as such specialist in accordance with DR 2-101 [Publicity and Advertis-
ing], DR 2-102 [Professional Notices, Letterheads, offices and law lists] and DR 2-
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lication of information regarding the nature of a lawyer's practice, pro-
vided that it is not false, fraudulent, or misleading.106 Obviously, this ap-
proach is the least offensive to the first amendment.07 Since false,
fraudulent, and misleading speech is not protected by the first amend-
ment,0 s these provisions are virtually immune from first amendment con-
stitutional challenge. 109
The foregoing discussion is limited in that it presupposes individual
lawyer advertising by way of some form of mass media, either print or
electronic. The focus of the discussion has been the constitutionality of
restrictions on the content of lawyer advertising, specifically information
contained in the advertisement pertaining to a specialty or to the areas of
law practiced.
As this area of law develops, a variety of fact situations will arise in
which restrictions, as they apply to various advertisements, will be chal-
lenged. Although the basic content of these advertisements will probably
be the same as that discussed here, the method of advertising or format
of the advertisement will vary. For example, consideration has already
been given in several courts to cases involving telephone or other directo-
ries which list lawyers by the areas of law in which they practice.110
It is beyond the scope of this comment to predict and analyze all the
103 [Recommendation of Professional Employment].
(B) A lawyer may state, announce or hold himself out as limiting his practice to a
particular area or field of law so long as his communication of such limitation of
practice is in accordance with the standards of DR 2-101 [Publicity and Advertising],
DR 2-102 [Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices and Law Lists], or DR 2-103
[Recommendation of Professional Employment] as appropriate.
106. See MODEL Ru .s OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 7.4 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
107. The Virginia State Bar recognized that the 1979 amendment to Canon 2 of the Vir-
ginia Code of Professional Responsibility may be broader than required by Bates, but con-
cluded that any attempt to restrict advertisements that are not false and misleading would
cause unnecessary challenge and eventually fail to "stand the test of constitutional scru-
tiny." Comment, Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1978-
1979, 66 VA. L. Rav. 167, 214 (1980). The amendment was criticized at the time because it
permitted considerable and costly advertising, unlike the amended ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility which prevented "puffery," "advertising that encouraged frivilous
suits," and "advertisements that harm the integrity of the legal profession." Id. at 215.
108. See supra text accompanying note 12.
109. But see supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
110. This is distinguishable from an individual lawyer's listing areas of his practice in an
advertisement in that the directory listing, because of its format, affects all lawyers in the
community. Some argue that this form of advertising effectively forces lawyers to designate
areas of their practice when they might not otherwise do so, because unless they do, they
will not be listed at all. See, e.g., THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAc TELEPHONE COMPANY OF
VIRGINIA, GREATER RICHMOND YELLOW PAGES 418-27 (Sept. 15, 1982). See generally Con-
sumer Union v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976); In re Mountain Bell
Directory Advertising, - Mont. ... , 604 P.2d 760 (1979); Zimmerman v. Office of Griev-
ance Comms., 79 A.D.2d 263, 438 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1981).
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various forms that advertising of legal specialties and the nature of a legal
practice will take. However, the Court in In re R.M.J. indicated that its
analytical framework is to be used to evaluate the constitutionality of reg-
ulations as they apply to those advertisements."1 Although there are
open questions as to the application of the In re R.M.J. analysis in cases
involving the regulation off advertising format,' the basic analysis will
be the same as discussed herein.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trend in recent years has been to allow lawyers to advertise a
greater amount of information. State bar associations have increasingly
recognized the need to provide the public with additional information re-
garding the availability of legal services and have recognized that some of
the old justifications for restricting advertising are no longer valid.
In light of the analytical framework announced by the United States
Supreme Court in In re R.M.J., major changes in state rules restricting
lawyer advertising appear likely. Since In re R.M.J. has made virtually
unenforceable '" the regulatory type rules fashioned after DR 2-105(A)(2)
of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, states with such
rules are now faced with the need to revise them or the likelihood of un-
ending constitutional challenges regarding the application of these rules
to individual lawyer advertisements.
In revising their rules, these states would do well to follow the lead of
the drafters of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
state bars of those states which have directive type rules, such as Vir-
ginia. 4 The drafters of these provisions have shown considerable fore-
sight regarding the constitutional trend with respect to a lawyer's first
amendment right to advertise.
Kenneth J. Alcott
111. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43 and note 43.
112. Id. In addition, there is the question of whether the restriction regulates content or
format. For example, in the telephone directory described in note 110, supra, the listing by
practice (format) communicates the availability of various legal services (content). In such a
case, a clear distinction between regulation of content and format does not exist.
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06 and notes 104-05.
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